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Kant’s account of aesthetic appreciation was the experience of
attending to something as purposive yet without attending to a
purpose. In Noel Carroll’s account of what this means, he says, ‘We
savor the colours in the painting of a tree for their richness and variety
rather than using them to tell ourselves what kind of tree it is. We
imaginatively explore the multiple, metaphorical, shifting meanings that
a heraldic emblem might have, rather than simply, practically regarding
it as the insignia of a certain family or clan.’1 Carroll suggests that this
account of aesthetic experience involves two distinct conceptions of
freedom: the freedom of disinterestedness, that is, not being concerned
with any practical, moral, financial or political interest, and freedom in
the sense in which the imagination and understanding are free from the
governance of concepts.2 As David Whewell has observed, ‘Few ideas in
the history of aesthetics have been more pervasive than that of the
disinterestedness of the aesthetic attitude.’3 This paper explores whether
this concept of aesthetic appreciation can be applied cross culturally—
that is, is it a fundamental human experience, as many of us presup-
pose? If it is not, then what would a cross-cultural concept of aesthetics
look like, and how would it affect our philosophical understanding of
aesthetic appreciation?
Surrounding this issue is a debate, if one may call it that, about
whether indigenous arts, or artefacts or primitive arts, whatever you
would like to call them, are arts. Often it has some political heat, as each
side accuses the other as imposing an ideology that reinforces the
structures of colonial domination. Here I offer a kind of composite
version of the positions as I understand them.
One side of this debate suggests that people who deny that indige-
nous arts are art are imposing an ideology which establishes a hierarchy
of what is valuable that allows other groups of people to be seen as less
cultured, and that reproduces colonial domination. For these people, to
say that indigenous groups do not have art, or do not aesthetically
appreciate it, is to maintain a hierarchy of value that makes the
achievements of the other ‘invisible’. According to this view, it is wrong
to deny that other cultures have art or aesthetics. We think art and
aesthetics are among the highest human achievements, and to suggest
art and aesthetics are specific to European cultures is to suggest that
European cultures are somehow more civilised than others.
The other side of this debate considers the description of indige-
nous arts as Arts appropriative, and an expression of colonial domi-
nation. In appreciating works as arts, we associate indigenous product
with the arts market, and give it an exchange value according to its
rarity, or beauty. Because of the ideology of the genius creator or
master, works become attached to a name, and are valued in relation to
this name. This kind of gallery appreciation seriously distorts our
understanding of the cultural phenomenon, by dislocating and misrep-
resenting indigenous artefacts and their value. According to this view, it
is wrong to suggest that other cultures have arts or aesthetics, as this is
the means by which we appropriate the artefacts of other cultures.
It’s rather hard to choose between positions, at least if you want to
be on the side of the good guys. If the choice is between a form of
colonial domination and a form of colonial domination, I guess I’ll just
have to engage in a form of colonial domination. Let me enter deeper
into the mire.
We need to make a distinction between art and aesthetics. I’m going
to argue that it is true that aesthetic appreciation, in its formulation in
terms of disinterestedness, is culturally specific, and that there are
merits to the arguments presented by anthropologists who present this
argument. I’ll show this through a discussion of Pierre Bourdieu’s argu-
ment that the concept of a ‘pure’ aesthetic is intrinsically linked to the
social and historical processes that produced the Western arts industry.
However, our concepts are not necessarily determined by history. We
can create conceptions of aesthetic appreciation that are not associated
with disinterestedness, do not dislocate objects from their purpose. I
will explore one such conception of aesthetics, as articulated by the
anthropologist Howard Morphy, and develop it through the use
(misuse?) of accounts of aesthetics offered by the philosophers Thomas
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Leddy and David Novitz. As I will show, such an account presents a
radically different picture of what it means to aesthetically appreciate
something. It allows us to acknowledge aesthetics and art as cross
cultural phenomena, without misrepresenting indigenous arts, and,
moreover, allows us to better understand religious works in our own
tradition.
1. Is Aesthetics a Cross-Cultural Concept?
A couple of years ago there was debate organised among anthro-
pologists on the proposition, ‘Aesthetics is a cross cultural concept.’
Joanna Overing led the attack on the idea that aesthetics was a concept
that could be used by anthropologists. Overing argued that aesthetics is
a culturally specific concept.4 According to Overing, the fact that the
category of aesthetics was created by Baumgarten in 1735 shows that its
meaning is intrinsically historical and not universal. She suggests that
the study of ‘aesthetics’ simply means the study of fine art, and she
defined fine art as art that does not have a purpose.The art institution is
a kind of cult of the art object, an object which is sacralised and set apart
from everyday objects, and she states that, within this cult, artefacts in
everyday life could not be beautiful: ‘it was only when an object had no
use that it could be beautiful, only when created for the contemplation
of beauty alone that it could it thereby become art.’5 In contrast, she
suggests, is the Piaroa conception of beauty, which is not detached from
contexts of productive use.6 ‘The idea that art transcends an every day
reality remains central to anthropological sensibility’, she says, and she
thinks it follows from this that ‘the Piaroa view of beauty and its relation
to everyday production cannot be understood within our category of
aesthetics.’7
This is possibly one of the worst arguments ever presented. It relies
on an equivocation between aesthetics and fine art, and contradicts
itself by explaining a Piaroa concept of beauty. But it is a common
argument. Similarly Alfred Gell has argued that aesthetics is to fine art,
what theology is to religion.8 Just as theological discourse cannot be
used as part of the study of other cultures, or throw light on the rela-
tionship between religion and society, Gell suggests, aesthetics is not
suitable as an anthropological category.
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In response to this, many philosophers of art would acknowledge
fine art as a Western institution, and a relatively modern one at that, yet
point out that we think of medieval religious art as art, and indeed all
manner of objects as art. It may be argued that we can call other cul-
tural productions art because we can recognise that significant thought
and attention has been paid to how an object is made, and that this
thought concerns the relationship of form and content. We can recog-
nise and appreciate this aesthetic intention, even where aesthetic appre-
ciation is not the primary function of an object. Denis Dutton gives a
particularly convincing account of this kind of intention in an example
of driving.9 He considers the case of a person’s intention to get
somewhere, and if you asked him or her what their purpose was, they
might tell you they were going to work.10 None the less, we can recog-
nise other intentional acts made by the driver—that, for example, they
stayed on the left-hand side of the road, and stopped at red lights. The
driver would describe none of these acts as ‘their intention’, but they
are none the less intentional acts. Similarly, he argues, aesthetic atten-
tion to form and material is perceptible in the making, and the final
product, of an object made in another culture, even though the purpose
of making the object does not involve making art.Whatever the purpose
of making the object may be, it is possible to recognise that these
objects, or products, involve skill, care, sensitivity and intelligence. That
is, we can recognise this behaviour as involving artistic choices. This
artistic choice may be considered a reason for believing that art is a
cross-cultural phenomenon. This argument does not depend on the
artist having self-conscious intentions to create art, or to create an
object for aesthetic appreciation, but depends on objects having proper-
ties that allow them to be aesthetically appreciated. According to an
‘aesthetic functionalist’ approach, something is an artwork if it is an
artefact and functions to provide for aesthetic appreciation.11 It might
be thought that one benefit of this approach is that it ‘allows for cross
cultural art identification without troubling ourselves over the specific
purposes for which the work was created.’12
Elsewhere, Dutton has done an admirable job pointing out the
weaknesses of Overing and Gell’s arguments that other cultures do not
have art13—I won’t go into the arguments here, however there does
appear to be something left over to say. We can and must distinguish
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between arguments about whether a culture has art, and whether it has
something like aesthetic appreciation. Whatever the value of arguments
that other cultures do not have ‘Art as we know it’, which appear quite
readily disposed of by pointing to the variety of objects we think of as
arts that we do not think of as fine arts, I think there is some merit to
the argument that aesthetics is not a cross cultural category.
The most persuasive account of why aesthetic appreciation (under-
stood in terms of disinterested contemplation) cannot be thought of as a
cross-cultural concept that I have read was presented by Pierre Bourdieu
in his article “The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic”.14 Bourdieu
argued that the aesthetic attitude is not shared by all humanity, or even
by all people at all times in Western societies. He picks up on the current
popular theoretical position that art is not defined by a type of creation,
but a kind of social institution, and argues that it follows from this that
the consciousness of the aesthetic attitude is also historically produced.
Bourdieu writes: ‘although appearing to be a gift from nature, the eye of
the twentieth century art lover is really a product of history.’15 According
to Bourdieu, aesthetic appreciation, the disinterested contemplative
attitude of the art lover, is a product of history, because the process of
aesthetic appreciation is inseparable from the historical appearance of
producers of art motivated by artistic intention, and is inseparable from
the production of fine art as autonomous and as having ends and
standards that are found or created by the artist. He points out that there
have been many different answers to the question ‘What is art’? For
example, we might think art is expressive of the emotions, or that it has
significant form, or that it involves mimesis, or that it is the product of
genius. What all these approaches have in common is the absence of a
function of a work of art. Moreover, they share in an attempt to find an
a-historical essence to aesthetic production or appreciation. The expe-
rience of seeing something as ‘art’ immediately gives us what we see—a
meaning and value, that also presents us with an ‘appropriate stance’ to
take towards it.This appropriate stance might be described as a reverent
attention to ‘the work’. The aesthete is a product of the social process of
viewing works of art. Put bluntly, aesthetic appreciation, or having an
aesthetic experience, is culturally specific learnt response or ability.
This creates a hermeneutic circle. The institution of art is main-
tained by people who accord art a special status, and the aesthetic
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attitude is dependent on, and a product of this institution, just as the
institution is dependent upon, and a product of, the aesthetic attitude.
The circle is maintained by belief in the ‘sacred’ status (sacred as in set
apart from every day or mundane functions) of the art work.
So, you might summarise the objection to the very possibility of an
anthropology of aesthetics as based on the proposition that the aesthetic
experience is a culturally produced experience that arises from a
specific cultural production, fine art. With the rise of fine art, the West
has developed a culturally specific way of aesthetic appreciation, a kind
of disinterested contemplation. As many other cultures do not have fine
art they do not have what we characterise as ‘an aesthetic experience’.
And, according to this argument, if it is true that when Piaroa or other
indigenous peoples characterise certain attributes of their art as
important because of a purpose or function, and respond to the object
in relation to these purposes or beliefs rather responding to the object
without reference to its purpose, then they are not identifying what we
could generally call ‘an aesthetic experience’. The idea that aesthetic
appreciation is ‘disinterested’ appears to be the primary reason why you
might think an anthropology of aesthetics is impossible.
Bourdieu appears correct in his characterisation of the dominant
philosophical understanding of aesthetic appreciation as disinterested.
This is true, despite the variety of formulations of the concept of ‘an
aesthetic experience’. I’ll only offer a few examples, as presented by
Noël Carroll in his book Beyond Aesthetics.16 Carroll categorises accounts
of aesthetic experience into four kinds, the traditional account, the prag-
matic account, the allegorical account, and his own deflationary account.
What appears to be common to all these articulations of ‘an aesthetic
experience’ is the idea of disinterestedness in the sense of being distinct
from moral, political, or instrumental purposes.
The traditional account is of a concept of aesthetic experience that
identifies such an experience as ‘intrinsically’ valuable. It involves con-
templating an artwork for its own sake, rather than as having some kind
of instrumental value.17
The pragmatic account, represented by philosophers like John Dewey,
characterises aesthetic experience in terms of its ‘internal structure’ as ‘an
experience’. The structure of ‘an experience’ involves duration, a quali-
tative unity, and temporal integration and closure. Carroll suggests these
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must be considered necessary rather than sufficient considerations for an
aesthetic experience, as these conditions do ‘not differentiate the aesthetic
experience of art from any other sorts of experience.’18 So it appears that,
for Dewey, the aesthetic qualities of an experience may arise within expe-
riences of events that have an instrumental, political or moral purpose,
but they involve an experience of properties that are distinct from those
purposes. He suggests that we can learn to identify these aesthetic pro-
perties through learning to appreciate art.
The third account of aesthetic experience presented by Carroll is
what he describes as an allegorical account to be found in Herbert
Marcuse and T.W. Adorno. Both accounts focus on the autonomy of
art. For Marcuse, art is valuable because it opens up a dimension to
experience that is only available beyond ‘reality’. In art, ‘Subjects and
objects encounter the appearance of that autonomy which is denied
them in their society.’ 19 Carroll explains that for Adorno, ‘because the
work of art is autonomous or lacking any other function than that of
producing aesthetic experience (which is itself free of any instrumental,
practical, and therefore, social interest) art may serve as an occasion for
a demystifying, negating experience of social reality’.20 Both accounts
share a central premise in regarding aesthetic experience as disin-
terested, and rely heavily on Kant’s account of aesthetic experience as
the experience of attending to something as purposive yet without
attending to a purpose.
Carroll’s own deflationary account of aesthetic experience identifies
two features he considers paradigmatic. The first is attendance to, and
appreciation of, an object’s design, that is, the structure or form of an
artwork, taking note of how it ‘hangs, or does not hang, together’.21 The
second is the appreciation of aesthetic and expressive qualities, taking
notice, for instance, of ‘the lightness and grace of a steeple, or the
anguish of a verse’.22 An aesthetic experience, on this account, is ‘an
experience whose content is the response-dependent, qualitative
dimension of the object.’ 23 Like the many other accounts of aesthetic
experience, Carroll’s account makes a sharp distinction between
aesthetic experience, and other experiences of an artwork, such as the
moral indignation accompanying blasphemy and sacrilege, or political
indignation about racism in the content of a novel. Carroll suggests
these responses are quite different from aesthetic responses.
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I realise this is a very quick survey of what we might mean by an
aesthetic experience, but I think that these are not isolated or peculiar
accounts of what it means to have one, and it supports Bourdieu’s point
that the aesthetic attitude, as we generally understand it, is charac-
terised by disinterestedness.
Bourdieu’s account of the historical relationship between the rise of
the concept of a distinct, or autonomous, realm of aesthetics and the
history of the development of our art institutions and practices also
appears to be correct, or at least uncontroversial. Crispin Sartwell has
pointed out that:
If the aesthetic is to be insulated from ordinary human pur-
poses and emotions, and if it is to induce an exalted state in
which such human purposes and emotions are to be held in
suspension or distanced, then it must be firmly distinguished
from craft, entertainment, industry, information technologies,
and other spheres of practical or economic activity. This con-
ception of the aesthetic thus corresponds to a conception of
fine art which in turn coincides with the beginnings of the
modern museum system… These conceptually interlocked
notions of art and the aesthetic in turn fuel a set of artistic
practices that are associated with romanticism and mod-
ernism.24
Similarly, in The Invention of Art, Larry Shiner points out that appro-
priate, respectful behaviour in galleries, theatre and music, developed
historically, and were part of an intentional education program on the
part of these institutions, and disinterested contemplation became a
marker of the upper class appreciation of fine art as opposed to the raw,
emotional, boisterous response of the lower classes to the popular arts.25
Bourdieu, Sartwell and Shiner all point to a historical ‘coincidence’: the
development of a concept of aesthetic appreciation, the development of
a practice of aesthetic appreciation, the development of an arts institu-
tion, and the development of artistic practice. The ‘coincidence’ is not a
mere coincidence; all these developments are mutually supportive. Yet,
this doesn’t seem quite enough to prove the argument that aesthetic
appreciation is culturally specific. If the anthropologists’ claims that
64 LITERATURE AND AESTHETICS
aesthetics cannot be used in anthropology are to have any bite, they
need to show more than that the concept is culturally specific, but that
the experience is culturally distinct or specific.
Our practices, that is, what we do, influences what we experience.
We can understand this even without a grand Marxist theory that
modes of production produce modes of consciousness. Here is a non-
artistic example. I took up tennis a couple of years ago. As I learnt to
play tennis, I learnt to see and ‘to read’ a ball. I actually experienced
different things to what I experienced prior to playing tennis. It was no
longer ‘something yellow and round and coming at me fast’, it was
something yellow, round, coming at me fast, that would bounce in a
certain way, at a certain point of a court, that I could respond to in a
variety of ways. I’m told that a professional player experiences the ball
quite differently again, as though it is in slow motion. I have no reason
to doubt this. The point can also be made in art. We appreciate artistic
production because we have learned what is involved in the skills of
painting, and making music and so forth, very often trying ourselves in
school. Similarly, we teach people ‘what to take note of ’ in paintings in
art history classes, and how to recognise the structure of a symphony in
music. Our skill development is associated with learning the ideology of
the genius artist in art history, and, along the way, we learn to appre-
ciate art in a certain way.
What is important to note here is that, if we define an aesthetic
experience as disinterested, and if we acknowledge that this concept
and practice of appreciation arises historically and is a learnt response,
then there is substantial agreement between philosophers arguing that
art is a cross cultural phenomenon, and anthropologists arguing that
aesthetics is not a cross cultural concept.
For example, Dutton’s response to Susan M. Vogel’s argument that
the Baule’s concept of art is not like our concept of fine art, because the
Baule believe the artefacts are merged with the spirit world and have
great power, is to point out that the same problem applies to arts in our
own tradition:
[A] majority of believers whose religious sentiments were
inspired by Giotto’s frescos at Padua might have been just as
moved by similar frescos which did not approach Giotto’s
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artistry; in other words, the original audience might have
possessed little or no appreciation of the comparative artistic
value… of Giotto’s frescos, and would have been responding
to them as religious narratives. Part of understanding the
cultural importance of Giotto for his original audience… is
grasping the place of his works in a specific economy of reli-
gious thought, and religion, though often intermingled with
art, need not be confused with it.26
While Dutton disagrees that the merging of spiritual power and an
object disqualifies that object from being art, Dutton is agreeing that if
the interest in and response to a painting is in relation to its spiritual
power, then it is not an aesthetic experience. I have presented a similar
argument myself in relation to whether the category of something being
‘sacred’ can contribute to our aesthetic appreciation.27
The notion of disinterestedness in our account of aesthetic
experience disengages aesthetic experience from life’s other concerns,
in the same way that Western cultures disengage fine art from life’s
purposes. I think this disengagement of aesthetic experience from life
is a problem, at least it is a problem if we want to argue that aesthetic
appreciation is a universal experience or that ‘aesthetics’ is a cross
cultural concept. If we recognise that this disinterested experience is
culturally produced, we must also recognise that something that ‘func-
tions to provide for aesthetic appreciation’ only functions that way
from our perspective, and that it is true that when we place these
objects into a gallery context we impose a new value on them. But
equally, if we accept that the aesthetic attitude as disinterested
contemplation is a learnt response to the rise of a culturally specific art
form, it is a problem for our understanding of the significance of many
of the art forms of our own tradition. How do we understand what
Giotto was doing? I think Dutton is right that we cannot say his
frescos were some kind of ‘by product’ of religion; Giotto was inten-
tionally producing certain effects. We may also assume that Giotto
lacked the intention to make ‘art’; his actions were intimately con-
nected to a religious purpose. This poses the question, how did
religion and religious values influence, but not determine, what Giotto
produced? And, if Giotto’s contemporaries were not ‘aesthetically
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appreciating’ his paintings, what were they doing? Does the influence
of religious values actually mean they could not distinguish between
different images because they were all sacred and therefore equally
good or powerful? 
My intuition, and I suspect I share it with many other people,
philosophers and non philosophers alike, is that aesthetic appreciation
is a basic human capacity. If it is the case that aesthetic appreciation is a
basic human capacity, and it is the case that the predominant philo-
sophical understanding of aesthetic appreciation as disinterested is a
culturally specific concept, then we need to explore other ways of
articulating what aesthetic appreciation involves (at least we do if we
want to say something applicable cross culturally). Against the position
of some anthropologists who believe that the meaning of words is
determined by history, we have the capacity to explore other concep-
tions of aesthetic appreciation. And, as the association between aes-
thetic experience and disinterestedness appears to be the most signifi-
cant problem for a cross cultural concept of aesthetics, we might begin
by exploring what aesthetic appreciation would look like if it did not
make this connection. A model for this could be the conception of
aesthetics articulated by the anthropologist Howard Morphy.
2. An Anthropology of Aesthetics
Morphy’s aim as anthropologist is to explain how the sensuous qualities
of objects intersect with their value and human behaviour. He argues that
anthropology needs to focus on the aesthetic intentions and responses of
people in order to explain certain facts about the properties of objects.
For example, Morphy suggests that we cannot explain why all the beads
from the Aurignacian period in Europe some 30,000 years ago are in
pastels and have a soft soapy texture, if we do not focus on the intentional
acts of agents choosing certain pigments and qualities.28
The questions anthropologists ask are questions about the relation-
ship of certain kinds of behaviour to the structures of society. According
to Charlotte Otten, the first anthropologist to recognise the social
element in artistic behaviour was Ernst Grosse, who in 1894, called for a
scientific, ‘rather than aesthetic’ response to its study.29 Durkheim con-
nected Aboriginal totems, which we would now recognise as sculptures
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and paintings, to religion, arguing that religion just is society worshiping
itself,30 thereby placing what we would consider art as central to society.
More recently, anthropologists have paid specific attention to the man-
ner of presentation of objects, rather than merely focussing on the social
function or its meaning. The value of this approach is that it connects
how something is made to its meaning or social function. Some anthro-
pologists have focussed on the relationship between style and cultural
function, for example, in studies of Eskimo masks that connect levels of
abstraction with levels of sacredness (Vastokas in 1967, as well as Ray in
1967).31 Morphy’s work on levels of abstraction in Yolngu art, and on the
relationship between abstraction and sacredness may be seen within this
tradition.32 In this account of aesthetics, however, Morphy is not con-
cerned with something that may be identified with art, but with ‘aes-
thetics’ as a primary mode of socialisation and experience that operates
in every aspect of a culture.
Morphy’s account of aesthetics is not entirely resolved, and is often
densely written, making it hard to analyse.Yet there appear to be three
central elements to his account of aesthetics, the physical properties of
objects and their effect on the senses, the values and connotations
physical properties acquire culturally, and the connection between
those connotations and the semiotic for example, symbols of power, or
religious symbols.
In one article, he presents two definitions of aesthetics. First, he
defines aesthetic experience as ‘the effect of the physical properties of
objects on the senses, and the qualitative evaluation of those properties.’ 33
On reflection of what this might mean it appears that what counts as the
effect of physical properties is the recognition of qualities, such as
hardness, or softness, dullness or brilliance, but the properties recognised
may also be more abstract than this. For example, Morphy includes the
recognition of efficiency and aptness, as well as the recognition of a
balanced composition or of harmony. The recognition of some proper-
ties, such as a balanced composition, involves acculturation. In this res-
pect, his basic account of aesthetics is similar to the deflationary account
presented by Carroll, yet his second account of aesthetics is quite
different.
In a rephrasing of his first definition of aesthetics, Morphy states
‘aesthetics is concerned with the qualitative dimension of perception,
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and the incorporation of perceptible properties into systems of value
and meaning that integrate them with cultural processes.’ 34 This slightly
different phrasing extends the application of the term. According to
Morphy, aesthetics permeates all levels of material culture. So, for
example, it concerns how I dressed today, and the design of the chair
you are sitting on. It may also permeate non-material aspects of culture,
such as etiquette, or story telling. Accordingly, we may speak of every-
thing having an aesthetic dimension. A person may do something
graciously, or in-graciously. A story, or, for that matter, a philosophy
essay, may have good form. Stated this way, it sounds similar to
Dewey’s account of aesthetics. However, there are significant differ-
ences. Morphy’s account does not include an analysis of what it is to
have ‘an experience’. In addition, Dewey’s account of aesthetic experi-
ence still makes a distinction between function, or meaning, and the
aesthetic appreciation of an event or experience. According to Dewey,
our aesthetic appreciation involves identification of aesthetic properties
that are distinct from the purposes of an event or experience. Morphy’s
account of aesthetics includes social function as part of its analysis.
Morphy’s concept of aesthetic experience may therefore be contrasted
with Dewey’s account of the aesthetic appreciation of an experience: if
aesthetic appreciation is disinterested, aesthetic experience is not. The
religious experience of spiritual power, or the feeling of being in the
presence of an authority, would count as aesthetic experiences, even if
they could not count as aesthetic appreciation.35
At the same time, there’s a slip between this account of aesthetics,
and functionalist or structuralist approaches. Morphy writes:
Aesthetics is concerned with the whole process of sociali-
sation of the senses with the evaluation of the properties of
things. However, such socialisation takes place in the context
of the process whereby qualities acquire connotations and are
incorporated within systems of meanings. This can happen at
the general level of the qualities themselves, as Munn has
shown in the case of heaviness and lightness in the Massim
region of Papua New Guinea. More specifically, qualities are
organised into formal systems of art, music or design, to
create forms which can be used for particular purposes or to
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create contexts for certain events. Thus music or sculpture
may be intended for contemplation or to mark a royal cele-
bration.
It is this interrelationship between the sensual and the
semantic that makes aesthetics such an important focus for
anthropological research, for just as the quality of a sensation
may be interpreted as a meaningful sign, so too can an idea
evoke an aesthetic response. Ideas can calm and excite the
senses as much as objects can.36
But here Morphy appears to strain his concept of aesthetics once too
far. How do ideas excite the senses? Which senses do they excite? If they
do, it is not the same way that an object does. This cannot be included
within his definition of aesthetics because it is not the physical effect of
something on the senses and the qualitative evaluation of it, or an
account of the physical qualities of their objects and their relationship
with a value system. We are no longer describing sensory effects. If we
give up the definition, or the importance of the sensory effect, we have
also given up on boundaries to the subject being studied. The word
aesthetics would simply become another word for values. Ideas can only
excite the senses if they are expressed. The focus of an analysis of
aesthetics must be on this form, and not on a disembodied idea.
In what follows, I intend to articulate an account of aesthetic experi-
ence that I take to be consistent with this position. However, I intend to
start my analysis from our every day experience of aesthetics, through
two philosophers: Thomas Leddy and David Novitz. Leddy has argued
that analytic aesthetics has not merely overlooked one or two aesthetic
qualities, but at least an entire class that he calls ‘every day surface’
qualities, such as neat, messy, clean and dirty.37 Leddy sets out to prove
that these are indeed ‘aesthetic qualities’ and our appreciation of them
qualifies as ‘aesthetic appreciation’ by testing our experience of them
against various mainstream formulations of what it means for some-
thing to be an aesthetic quality or an aesthetic experience. A more
radical exploration of every day aesthetic perception, which challenged
the separation of aesthetic concerns and experience from socially held
values was presented by Novitz in an essay exploring the social impli-
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cations of grooming and dress codes.38 Novitz’s account of aesthetic
experience directly challenges the notion of aesthetic experience as
disinterested, placing it firmly within a social structure. While Novitz’s
account may pose a more direct challenge to the account of aesthetic
experience as disinterested, Leddy’s account appears to presuppose this
challenge by discussing how we learn to apply these aesthetic terms in
childhood through acculturation. My presentation of these ideas is not
intended to be an accurate account of their work, but it is inspired by
it.39 The fact there is so little on everyday aesthetics seems at odds with
what I take to be an assumption shared by all philosophers concerned
with aesthetics: that it is a basic human experience.40 But it is equally
strange in the sense of other truisms as well, for example, the truism
that aesthetics is connected to how ‘at home’ we feel in the world.What
is interesting about such truisms is that they are not trivial, at least in
the sense that, if we take them seriously, they will have a revolutionary
impact on the philosophical study of aesthetics.
3. Everyday Aesthetics
A sense of aesthetics is brought in to play when I decorate my house in
certain colours, fabrics and designs. I don’t think that is a controversial
statement. And, if Leddy is correct, and I think he is, a sense of
aesthetics is brought in to play when I clean and order that environ-
ment. I do not clean my house for purely utilitarian reasons, ordering
tidying and cleaning it have utilitarian effects, such as hygiene and
efficiency, but I do more than merely clean it and place things in
ordered piles, I arrange them into pleasing collections. The effect of a
clean and tidy space is also satisfying; it creates a sense of order or
rightness about the world. It is as though I organise the world around
me in order to give me ‘a place’ in the world that is ‘mine’, and the
aesthetic qualities of that space determine my sense of well being.
Unsurprisingly, similar aesthetic qualities in the broader environment
affect a person’s sense of place in that environment. In an interesting
study of the sense of place and displacement within migrant communi-
ties in suburban Sydney, the anthropologist Amanda Wise has recently
explored how migrant communities express their sense of displacement
by reference to shop window displays, and the colours of the street-
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scape. With a recent influx of new migrant shopkeepers who covered
their windows with posters and cluttered the floor space with displays,
older migrants expressed a sense of being ‘shut out’ of the community.41
Such everyday aesthetic qualities are also connected to our values.
To make this relationship between values and sensual properties clear,
let me use examples with which you will no doubt be familiar. If you
were to go for a job tomorrow there are attributes that, whatever else,
you would endeavour to have. One is clean. Another is tidy or neat.You
would not go, if you could help it, with a sauce stain down your front.
You’d have washed, and would have groomed thoroughly. Your nails
would be clipped and clean; you’d have shaved. You may have had a
haircut.You’d have ironed your clothes.You’d have polished your shoes.
We do all this when we want to make a good impression. If you want
the job, you affect ‘the look’. And if you were on an interview panel,
judging candidates today, and someone did not turn up clean, neat, and
with shiny shoes, you’d notice. You would judge them in some way.
You’d think it was either an affectation of nonchalance, or that the
person was ‘a grot’, or that they weren’t trying and didn’t want the job
very much. However you interpreted their appearance, it would be
deeply meaningful. And there are acceptable limits to breaking these
rules. I put it to you that while nonchalance in a job interview is com-
patible with not ironing, and not polishing your shoes, it is incompatible
with dirt, or a dribble of sauce.
Clothing and grooming places us within a hierarchy of values that
we cannot escape, regardless of whether we consciously accept or reject
those values. Grooming equates to status and respectability. We know
the structure of our society in relation to these norms. Our responses
are immediate, and even physical. The street person is dirty, sometimes
smelly, and possibly slightly repugnant. The executive is sleek, a little
intimidating. Turning up to a formal function, such as a funeral,
wedding, or graduation, and even, according to some people, the opera,
without appropriate attire is an affront, or act of disrespect.
According to this account of aesthetic experience, the recognition of
attributes immediately places us in a social context. It gives us a sense
of place, gives us an orientation towards other people and things
according to a social hierarchy, and the system of values it introduces is
normative. The normative element involves a sense of rightness or
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wrongness about the world, things as they should be, as well as how we
should behave—an appropriate behaviour.
Everything I have been discussing about the properties of the world is
in relation to a sign. Shiny buttons on a well-tailored double-breasted
navy blue jacket tell me a lot about the world. They are a sign of res-
pectability. I know what I know about the world because I take the
qualities of the world, shininess, dirtiness, or whatever, as signs of the
world, just as I think smoke means fire and spots mean measles. Similarly,
when people say that for Mesopotamian people, the shininess of gold and
silver in a church was a sign of the presence of god, we can infer that the
sensual quality of shininess operated as a sign that told them something
about the world, their place in it according to a hierarchy of values, an
emotional response, and appropriate behaviour. Such signs often operate
in a similar way in our own culture. For example, in Australia, the Senate,
or Upper House, of our houses of parliament are often more elaborately
designed and decorated than the chambers of the Lower House, or
House of Representatives.42 The richness of design is a sign of power.
Novitz argues that we also bring religious, economic, moral and other
values to bear on our evaluations of art and that it is simply not true that
art operates in autonomy from these values:
The serene passivity of a Raphael Madonna is valued not just
because of the formal correctness of the painting but because of the
religious and gender-related values that we bring to it. By the same
token, we often respond aesthetically to, and admire, the architecture
and the interior decorations of the Palace of Versailles not merely…
because of their raw appearances but also because of their uninhibited
display of wealth. Indeed, we can speak aesthetically of the magnifi-
cence and resplendence of Versailles only because we share, or at least
understand, certain economic and political values. We admire both the
wealth required to build the palace and the power of the king who
could marshal such wealth.43
Earlier I posed three questions that I suggested were raised by our
account of aesthetic appreciation as disinterested. These were, how did
religion and religious values influence, but not determine, what Giotto
produced? And, if Giotto’s contemporaries were not ‘aesthetically
appreciating’ his paintings, what were they doing? Does the influence of
religious values actually mean they could not distinguish between dif-
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ferent images because they were all sacred and therefore equally good or
powerful? Answers that would be consistent with the account of
aesthetics I have just presented would indicate that there would be no
disjunction between appreciating the frescos as a religious narrative and
appreciating them aesthetically. Giotto shared with his contemporaries a
set of values about the connotations of certain properties, such as the
clarity and purity of colour, and the ‘proper way’ certain religious sub-
jects ought to be presented to do them justice, but it would not follow
that these values completely determined his artistic choices, any more
than the aesthetic properties of cleanliness, tidiness and shininess deter-
mine exactly what we wear to a job interview. His skill as an artist would
be admired to the extent to which these values were exemplified in his
paintings, but the value of the paintings would not be that they were
painted by Giotto, or innovative in the context of art history, but that
they did exemplify these religious values to a greater or lesser extent.
If one takes cognitive processes as those responsible for knowledge
and awareness, as well as the processing of experience, which is how
Simon Blackburn defines cognition,44 our apprehension of sensual qual-
ities in the world are fundamentally cognitive. We know that an object
has a certain property. We also know, or have a sense of, our place in
the world in terms of a social hierarchy, as well as the place of that
property within a hierarchy of values of clean unclean, attractive or
unattractive. That is, we know its place in a system of values. We know
how to treat things and to behave towards them—which might be in
terms of respect or as something to be fixed, cleaned and righted.
Where this use of the term ‘cognitive’ differs from an analytic use of the
term is that our apprehension or knowledge includes an emotional
response, often one we would rather not have.45 We experience disgust
when confronted by a person who is dirty, smelly and ungroomed,
regardless of whether we also know that they should be treated with
respect as a person. We experience anger when someone deliberately
flouts certain aesthetic conventions of grooming or manners. We
experience anxiety when we recognise someone as higher on the social
scale. These responses are part of what it means to have those values;
that is, they are the cognitive content of those values. Moreover,
according to this view of aesthetic experience, these emotions are aes-
thetic responses. They are learnt responses that relate to values. We
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learn, as children to recognise a clean and tidy room, and to enjoy
everything being in its place, just as we learn to recognise harmony or
significant form.We learn disgust in the same way that we learn beauty.
4. Conclusion
It is true that aesthetics, and the idea that an aesthetic experience is
disinterested, reflects a particularly Western social structure and the
fine arts system. The effect of the system’s separation of art from life is
a separation of aesthetics from function, that is, of aesthetics from life.
However, it does not follow from this that an anthropology of aesthetics
is impossible. An anthropology of aesthetics, understood as a concept
connecting sensory experience to cognition and to social structure has
yet to be developed in a comprehensive way. It cannot over reach itself
as moving beyond the sensory involves the danger of blurring the
distinction between aesthetics as a field of study, and a theory of value
or social structure. But if we maintain this focus, it promises new ways
of understanding cognition, as well as a way of understanding basic
human responses to being in the world.
An anthropology of aesthetics, or, as I have presented it here, an every-
day aesthetics, revolutionises our concept of an aesthetic experience.
This experience is not divorced from every day occurrences, and it is
not divorced from other parts of our life, such as politics or religion.
But perhaps something even more surprising than this is how our
sensory impressions, and every day aesthetics are so implicated in ideas
such as there being an order to the world, and appropriate responses to
it. Even at an everyday level, the order to the world may be understood
in terms of the pure and the impure, the clean and dirty, and in terms
of a hierarchy of social relationships. Everyday aesthetics is funda-
mentally social and cultural, partly because it is how we relate to others
and to our place in the world, but also because the recognition of
attributes is learnt in the very process of learning a set of values. Finally,
it is revolutionising in that our emotional responses are not only seen as
aesthetic responses, but as cognitive responses. They are not only a
response, or one response to our environment, they are an expression
of our understanding of that environment.
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